Alan focuses his practice exclusively on defending regulatory investigations and enforcement actions brought by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the United States Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), and state securities commissioners against brokers, broker-dealers, and investment auditors. He was previously Director of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Atlanta District Office, where he oversaw nearly 600 member firms and thousands of branch offices. Alan also served as a member of the NASD's Department of Enforcement, where he had the primary responsibility for prosecuting hundreds of formal disciplinary actions.

What is it with big firms and fingerprints? You may recall back in October 2017, J.P. Morgan entered into an AWC with FINRA in which it agreed to pay a $1.25 million fine for the following, as described in FINRA’s press release about the case:

FINRA found that for more than eight years, J.P. Morgan did not fingerprint approximately 2,000 of its non-registered associated persons in a timely manner, preventing the firm from determining whether those persons might be disqualified from working at the firm. In addition, the firm fingerprinted other non-registered associated persons but limited its screening to criminal convictions specified in federal banking laws and an internally created list. In total, the firm did not appropriately screen 8,600 individuals for all felony convictions or for disciplinary actions by financial regulators. FINRA also found that four individuals who were subject to a statutory disqualification because of a criminal conviction were allowed to associate, or remain associated, with the firm during the relevant time period. One of the four individuals was associated with the firm for 10 years; and another for eight years.

Ok, now compare that description to this one, from a press release that FINRA issued just two days ago to announce an AWC that Citigroup entered into, and in which it, too, agreed to pay a $1.25 million fine:
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Rightly or wrongly, I don’t know much about cryptocurrencies or digital coins. But that’s ok. What is worrisome, on the other hand, is that I am increasingly concerned that FINRA doesn’t either. And while my own ignorance will have exactly zero impact on your day, that is most certainly not the case with FINRA.

I came to this conclusion after reading Reg Notice 19-24, released last week. On its face, the Notice seems fairly benign. What it does is extend by one year FINRA’s “request” that “each member keep its Regulatory Coordinator informed of new activities or plans regarding digital assets, including cryptocurrencies and other virtual coins and tokens.” You may recall that last year, in Reg Notice 18-23, FINRA issued its initial request for this sort of information through the end of July 2019. Now, FINRA is “encouraging” its member firms to keep this up for another year, through July 2020.

I don’t have any real problem with this “request,” apart from my usual cynicism when FINRA uses this particular word. Remember: FINRA characterizes its use of Rule 8210 as “requests” for documents and information, as if the recipient has a choice whether or not to respond, when, in fact, the failure to respond to the “request” can result in a permanent bar from the industry. No, my problem is that as FINRA attempts to gets its head around digital assets, as a result of the fact that it doesn’t necessarily understand the regulatory issues that such products will ultimately generate, it is asking for information beyond that which it is entitled to receive.
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If you read this blog even semi-regularly, you know that I have taken a few shots at PIABA. I think they’re well earned, but some people – particularly PIABA lawyers, not surprisingly – have suggested that I’m overdoing it. Well, if you ever had any doubt that the motivation behind pretty much everything that PIABA does is simply doing whatever it can to ensure that its attorneys get paid, just take a look at PIABA’s comment to FINRA’s recent proposal to address rogue broker-dealers.

I have already written about that proposal, which is flawed in a number of fundamental ways, in my view. As expected, it elicited a bunch of comments. PIABA submitted its own comment, naturally, and, in a development that surprised exactly no one, it stated that its principal concern with the proposed rules is that they “will not cure the long-standing unpaid arbitration award issue.” Well, there you go. Leave it to PIABA to take a proposal designed by FINRA to address misconduct by rogue brokers and rogue firms – or as FINRA expressly phrased it, “to address the risks that can be posed to investors and the broader market by individual brokers and member firms that have a history of misconduct” – and focus instead on another issue, i.e., the one component of that proposal that impacts PIABA members’ pocketbooks. That is, rather than acknowledging that the proposal’s primary goal is to eliminate (or at least deter) misconduct, PIABA has chosen instead to complain that perhaps the most ridiculous aspect of the rule proposal – the creation of a fund, sourced by the BD itself, with money that would not constitute an allowable asset in the firm’s net capital computation, and which cannot be used for any purpose other than the satisfaction of a customer claim – somehow doesn’t go far enough to ensure that arbitration claimants – and their lawyers, of course – get paid.
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FINRA loves to tout its supposed intent to bring meaningful cases, cases that matter to the investing public, rather than enforcing “foot faults,” as it has been accused of doing over the years. My own experience with FINRA suggests that while it talks a big game, in reality, we all still live in foot-fault city.

I stumbled across this decision recently, and it serves as a good example of two problems that FINRA has. First, FINRA is, at times, maybe most times, hardly the model of efficiency when it comes to promptly bringing cases against perceived bad guys. Second, it reflects how FINRA is still willing to spend its finite resources, in terms of time, manpower, and money, on an utterly fruitless pursuit, resources that anyone would agree – including the FINRA lawyers who brought the case and the Hearing Officer who had to consider the evidence – would have been better spent on something else.

The case started out normally, with FINRA filing an Enforcement action against the broker-dealer in 2017, alleging a number of nasty sounding historical sales practice violations. According to the decision, however, and for reasons that went unexplained, the complaint was filed five years after the exam of the matter was started, and fully four years after the matter was referred to Enforcement. From the defense perspective, that is a long time. A long time for documents to be preserved, for witnesses’ memories to remain intact. Remember: FINRA is not restricted by statutes of limitations (like the SEC, or like civil litigants), but it is still supposed to be procedurally fair to respondents, and one aspect of that fairness is not waiting too long to file a complaint.
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Nearly ten years ago, FINRA decided to update its old suitability rule, NASD Rule 2310. It had been around a long time, and while it seemed to work fine, FINRA decided to incorporate into the new amended rule – FINRA Rule 2111 – some new concepts. One such concept concerned recommendations to hold. Under the old rule, only recommendations to purchase, sell or exchange a security had to be suitable. Under the new rule, FINRA added to that list recommendations to hold, provided, of course, that such recommendations are “explicit.”

And that’s been the law of the land since July 2012. There was a great deal of consternation, at first, as firms tried to figure out what, exactly, constituted an explicit recommendation to hold, and, more troubling, the best way to capture such recommendations from a books-and-records perspective. (Since no order ticket is generated by a hold recommendation, firms had to come up with some method of memorializing them, and that was a bit tricky.) But, really, it hasn’t turned out to be that big of a deal. To be honest, I don’t think I’ve ever seen a FINRA disciplinary action that involved an allegation that a broker made an unsuitable recommendation to hold.

The only place where recommendations to hold have managed to become the focus of any attention are in customer arbitrations, particularly cases where the recommendation to buy the investment at issue was made a long time ago. Pursuant to the “eligibility rule,” FINRA Rule 12206, for a claim even to be eligible for arbitration, the Statement of Claim must be filed within six years of the date of the event or occurrence which gives rise to the claim. Thus, if the purchase was made more than six years before the Statement of Claim was filed, the case is subject to dismissal. To avoid such dismissals, clever lawyers representing investors bake into their Statements of Claim vague allegations that at some time – typically no date is specifically identified – within the six-year period preceding the filing of the Statement of Claim, the BD and/or the broker made an unsuitable recommendation to hold the investment at issue. These claims serve one purpose: to avoid dismissal for being untimely. At the hearings, if the cases get that far, claimants devote almost no effort to pursue their hold claims.
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While I feel I have enjoyed as much success defending respondents in FINRA Enforcement matters as anyone, I am still careful to caution clients who are unwilling to consider any settlement that going toe-to-toe with FINRA at a hearing is always a difficult proposition, even though they are presumed innocent and FINRA bears the burden

Reading Reg Notice 19-17 makes me think of the legal arguments that I’ve recently read regarding whether a president can be found guilty of obstructing justice if the actions in question were taken out in the open, for everyone to see. Here, FINRA’s proposed power grab is simply outrageous, but, you got to give them

I have written before about the troubling lack of clarity regarding the tangible benefit of self-reporting rule violations to FINRA. While FINRA purports to provide some potential advantage for doing so, it is so awfully loosy-goosy that it remains a relatively uncommon occurrence. That’s why when a case comes down that provides some clear indication