What is it with big firms and fingerprints? You may recall back in October 2017, J.P. Morgan entered into an AWC with FINRA in which it agreed to pay a $1.25 million fine for the following, as described in FINRA’s press release about the case:

FINRA found that for more than eight years, J.P. Morgan did not fingerprint approximately 2,000 of its non-registered associated persons in a timely manner, preventing the firm from determining whether those persons might be disqualified from working at the firm. In addition, the firm fingerprinted other non-registered associated persons but limited its screening to criminal convictions specified in federal banking laws and an internally created list. In total, the firm did not appropriately screen 8,600 individuals for all felony convictions or for disciplinary actions by financial regulators. FINRA also found that four individuals who were subject to a statutory disqualification because of a criminal conviction were allowed to associate, or remain associated, with the firm during the relevant time period. One of the four individuals was associated with the firm for 10 years; and another for eight years.

Ok, now compare that description to this one, from a press release that FINRA issued just two days ago to announce an AWC that Citigroup entered into, and in which it, too, agreed to pay a $1.25 million fine:
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On Wednesday, the FINRA Board met and discussed two topics that I recently blogged about: recidivist brokers and unpaid arbitration awards.  In predictable fashion, FINRA withered in the face of criticism that its existing rules and policies are somehow not tough enough on its member firms, and embarked on a proposed series of steps

Remember a few weeks ago? Remember I blogged about Robert Cook, FINRA’s new CEO?  And how he was saying all the right things about FINRA perhaps being juuuuust a bit too Enforcement oriented?  I expressed hope – sincere but wary hope – that given his remarks, it was possible that the pendulum might actually start

Here is a fascinating analysis by my partner, Michael Gross, of FINRA’s twisted logic when it comes to sanctions:  your very decision not to admit liability and to put FINRA to its proof can, and will, be held against you when it comes time to determine the appropriate sanctions. Or will it?  –  Alan

The

It is a nasty thing when one becomes statutorily disqualified. It means either leaving the industry, permanently, or having to file an MC-400 and trying to convince FINRA that you should be permitted to remain in the industry, albeit subject to heightened supervision and extra scrutiny from FINRA.  I have previously blogged about statutory disqualification,

Just a week ago, I ran a post about FINRA’s Sanction Guidelines, suggesting that they appear to have no relevance anymore, given the vast disparity between fines that FINRA is actually imposing in settled cases, on the one hand, and the supposed maximum fines described in the Sanction Guidelines, on the other. In an excellent

I read with interest the press release FINRA issued this week announcing an $11.7 million settlement with LPL, principally over what FINRA characterized as “widespread supervisory failures.” There were two things most noteworthy to me.[1] The first, interestingly, is not the size of the monetary sanctions (a $10 million fine plus $1.7 million in

Before I became a District Director for NASD, I was an attorney with its Department of Enforcement. In those days, I would occasionally take someone “on the record,” but only when it was clear that a formal disciplinary action, i.e., a complaint, would be forthcoming. The purpose of the OTR was principally to memorialize and